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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
WILLIAM JAMES ASHTON,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
____________________________________)

NOS. 48437-2020 & 48438-2020
SHOSHONEs COUNTY NOS.
CR40-18-1503 & CR-2015-60

APPELLANT’S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
In this consolidated appeal, William James Ashton appeals from the district court’s
judgment revoking his probation and executing his unified sentence of four years, with two years
fixed, in CR-2015-60 (“the 2015 case”), and from the judgment of conviction in CR40-20181503 (“the 2018 case”), imposing a unified sentence of four years, with two years fixed.
Mr. Ashton contends the district court abused its discretion in both cases considering the
substantial mitigating factors that exist.
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Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
In the 2015 case, Mr. Ashton was convicted of possession of a controlled substance, and
sentenced to a suspended unified term of four years, with two years fixed, on June 10, 2015.
(48438 R., pp.67-76.) On October 26, 2015, the State filed a report of probation violation,
alleging Mr. Ashton violated probation by avoiding supervision. (48438 R., pp.83-84.) The State
alleged Mr. Ashton did not check into the probation office following entry of the judgment of
conviction, but inquired by telephone about a possible interstate transfer. (48438 R., p.82.) A
bench warrant was issued for Mr. Ashton’s arrest, and Mr. Ashton was arrested on October 3,
2018, following a traffic stop. (See 48438 R., p.85.) Mr. Ashton was driving in Idaho, and was
stopped by a police officer for having an obstructed license plate. (48437 R., p.12.) A drug dog
alerted on Mr. Ashton’s vehicle and drugs and drug paraphernalia were found inside the vehicle.
(48437 R., pp.12-13.) The State filed a new case against Mr. Ashton, the 2018 case, charging
him with possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. (48437
R., pp.59-61.)
Mr. Ashton agreed to plead guilty to violating his probation in the 2015 case, and to
possession of a controlled substance in the 2018 case, and the prosecutor agreed to recommend a
sentence in the 2018 case not to exceed a retained jurisdiction. (1/9/19 Tr. p.5, Ls.13-21.) The
district court accepted Mr. Ashton’s admission and his guilty plea, and released him on his own
recognizance on January 9, 2019. (1/9/19 Tr. p.9, Ls.13-22, p.10, Ls.5-15; 48438 R., pp.98-99.)
Mr. Ashton did not appear for the disposition/sentencing hearing.
On October 15, 2020, Mr. Ashton was arrested following a traffic stop, when he and his
son were traveling from Washington to Montana to buy a puppy. (See 48438 R., p.104; 11/4/20
Tr., p.12, Ls.5-8.) The district court held the delayed disposition/sentencing hearing on
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November 4, 2020. (See 11/4/20 Tr., p.5, Ls.3-8.) The prosecutor acknowledged he had made an
agreement with Mr. Ashton to recommend a retained jurisdiction, but said Mr. Ashton violated
the terms of the agreement by failing to appear for sentencing. (11/4/20 Tr., p.9, Ls.5-9.) The
prosecutor thus recommended an imposed sentence. (11/4/20 Tr., p.8, Ls.9-10.) Mr. Ashton
requested that he be continued on probation. (11/4/20 Tr., p.13, L.23 – p.14, L.6.)
The district court revoked Mr. Ashton’s probation in the 2015 case, and imposed his
unified sentence of four years, with two years fixed. (11/4/20 Tr., p.16, Ls.18-25.) In the 2018
case, the district court sentenced Mr. Ashton to a unified term of four years, with two years
fixed, to be served concurrently. (11/4/20 Tr., p.17, Ls.1-6.) The judgments in both cases were
filed on November 4, 2020. (48437 R., pp.107-12; 48438 R., pp.115-17.) Mr. Ashton filed timely
notices of appeal. (48437 R., pp.99-102; 48438 R., pp.107-10.)
On November 11, 2020, Mr. Ashton filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea and his
admission to violating his probation. (48437 R., pp.113-14, 199-20; 48438 R., pp.118-19, 12425.) He said he believed the prosecutor breached the terms of the plea agreement by
recommending that the district court impose his sentence. (48437 R., pp.136-45.) Following a
hearing, the district court concluded it lacked jurisdiction to grant Mr. Ashton’s motion in the
2015 case under State v. Fleshman, 144 Idaho 772 (Ct. App. 2007). (2/24/21 Tr., p.11, Ls.5-18.)
In the 2018 case, the district court concluded Mr. Ashton did not meet the “manifest injustice”
standard. (2/24/21 Tr., p.12, L.13 – p.13, L.8.) The district court explained:
This case is one where the defendant was clearly unhappy with . . . the court’s
sentence in these cases. Mr. Ashton had a different idea as to what the appropriate
sentence should be in his case, and the court exercised its discretion properly in
imposing the sentence that it did based on his prior record and his lack of
compliance with the Idaho sentences.
(2/24/21 Tr., p.12, Ls.18-25.)
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ISSUES
I.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Mr. Ashton’s probation and
executed his sentence in the 2015 case?

II.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it sentenced him in the 2018 case to a
unified term of four years, with two years fixed, and did not retain jurisdiction?

ARGUMENT
I.
Considering The Mitigating Factors, The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked
Mr. Ashton’s Probation And Executed His Sentence In The 2015 Case
“Review of a probation revocation proceeding involves a two-step analysis.” State v.
Garner, 161 Idaho 708, 710 (2017) (citations omitted). First, the reviewing court determines
“whether the terms of probation have been violated.” Id. (citation omitted). If the terms of
probation have been violated, the reviewing court then determines “whether the violation
justifies revocation of the probation.” Id. (citation omitted). Here, Mr. Ashton does not contest
that he violated a term of his probation, but contends his violation does not justify revocation.
In determining whether to revoke probation, a court must examine whether probation is
achieving the goal of rehabilitation and is consistent with the protection of society. State v.
Upton, 127 Idaho 274, 275 (Ct. App. 1995); State v. Beckett, 122 Idaho 324, 325 (Ct. App.
1992); State v. Hass, 114 Idaho 554, 558 (Ct. App. 1998). A decision to revoke probation will be
reversed on appeal where the decision constitutes an abuse of discretion. See Beckett, 122 Idaho
at 325. In reviewing an alleged abuse of discretion, this Court considers “[w]hether the trial
court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries
of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices
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available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason.” Lunneborg v. My Fun Life,
163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018) (citation omitted).
In this case, the district court did not reach its decision to revoke Mr. Ashton’s probation
by the exercise of reason because his probation was achieving the goal of rehabilitation (albeit
without the involvement of Mr. Ashton’s probation officer), and was consistent with the
protection of society. Mr. Ashton admitted to violating his Idaho probation by absconding
supervision. (1/9/19 Tr., p.10, Ls.5-14.) While Mr. Ashton certainly should have stayed in
contact with his Idaho probation officer, he was not absconding supervision in the typical sense.
Mr. Ashton was actually on probation in Washington at the time he was convicted in the 2015
case, and was always living at the same residence. (11/4/20 Tr., p.11, Ls.6-10.) Mr. Ashton
completed his probation in Washington by the time of the probation violation hearing in this
case, and had no violations. (11/4/20 Tr., p.11, Ls.16-20.) The fact that Mr. Ashton was able to
successfully complete his Washington probation means he is not a danger to the public.
Mr. Ashton has struggled with drug use, and the presentence investigator originally
recommended Mr. Ashton be allowed to participate in a rider program so that he could “relearn
the skills necessary to remain clean and sober.” (48438 PSI, pp.18, 26.) Mr. Ashton still needs to
work on remaining clean and sober. The district court’s decision to revoke Mr. Ashton’s
probation will not help Mr. Ashton on his journey to sobriety and is not necessary to protect
society. Counsel for Mr. Ashton explained to the district court that Mr. Ashton was in the
hospital at the time of the initial disposition/sentencing hearing, and then did not turn himself in
because he was the sole custodial parent of his son, with whom he resided in Spokane,
Washington. (11/4/20 Tr., p.10, L.19 – p.11, L.5.) While this does not excuse Mr. Ashton’s
conduct, it does suggest Mr. Ashton should not be incarcerated.
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II.
Considering The Mitigating Factors, The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It
Sentenced Mr. Ashton In The 2018 Case To A Unified Term Of Four Years, With Two Years
Fixed, And Did Not Retain Jurisdiction
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that where, as here, a district court imposes a sentence
within statutory limits, the appellant “has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on
the part of the court imposing the sentence.” State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997)
(quotation marks and citation omitted). In order to succeed on appeal under this standard, an
appellant “must establish that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was excessive
considering the objectives of criminal punishment,” which are deterrence, the possibility of
rehabilitation, punishment or retribution for wrongdoing, and the protection of society. State v.
Varie, 135 Idaho 848, 856 (2001) (citation omitted). Mr. Ashton can make the necessary
showing, as the district court should have retained jurisdiction, considering the objectives of
criminal punishment.
The first objective of criminal punishment is deterrence of the individual and the public
generally. See Varie, 135 Idaho at 856. Mr. Ashton is working on his sobriety, and is highly
motivated to succeed in order to be a good father. Sending Mr. Ashton to prison will not provide
him, or the general public, with any additional deterrence.
The second objective of criminal punishment is the possibility of rehabilitation. See
Varie, 135 Idaho at 856. Mr. Ashton needs substance abuse treatment, as originally
recommended in the 2015 case. (See 48438 PSI, pp.18, 26.) Being sentenced to a term of
imprisonment in Idaho, when his friends and family live out-of-state, will not aid Mr. Ashton in
his rehabilitation.
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The third objective of criminal punishment is punishment. See Varie, 135 Idaho at 856.
While Mr. Ashton is deserving of some punishment, as he admitted to violating Idaho law, the
crime (possession of a controlled substance) does not warrant a term of imprisonment on the
record presented.
The final and most important objective of criminal punishment is the protection of
society. See Varie, 135 Idaho at 856. As discussed above, with respect to Mr. Ashton’s 2015
case, the public does not need to be protected from Mr. Ashton, as he proved he can live in the
community by successfully completing his Washington probation. The district court may have
been frustrated with Mr. Ashton’s decision not to appear in court as ordered, but that does not
indicate he needs to be incarcerated, where he poses no danger to anyone other than himself if he
continues to use drugs. On the record presented, the district court should have retained
jurisdiction to allow Mr. Ashton to obtain substance abuse treatment and earn a chance at
probation.

CONCLUSION
In CR-2015-60, Mr. Ashton respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s
order revoking his probation and executing his sentence, and remand this case to the district
court for further proceedings. In CR40-2018-1503, Mr. Ashton respectfully requests that this
Court vacate his judgment of conviction and remand this case back to the district court for a new
sentencing hearing.
DATED this 19th day of August, 2021.
/s/ Andrea W. Reynolds
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 19th day of August, 2021, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
AWR/eas
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